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Changes in personality over ontogeny can occur even when every agent (individual
or genotype) is exposed to the same set of cues, experiences or environmental
conditions. A recent Bayesian model (Stamps and Krishnan, in press) shows how individual
differences in the means and variances of prior distributions of estimates of variables such
as danger can generate predictable individual differences in behavioral developmental
trajectories, and predictable changes in the differential consistency (broad-sense
repeatability) of behavior over ontogeny, even if every subject is reared and maintained
under the same conditions. We use this model to highlight the distinction between
potential plasticity (the ability of an agent to change its phenotype in response to different
types of experience) and realized plasticity (the extent to which an agent’s phenotype
actually changes in response to a specific experience), and to demonstrate why the
realized behavioral developmental plasticity of a given agent might vary as a function of the
type of cues to which that agent was exposed over ontogeny. We describe two commonly
used experimental protocols for studying individual differences in developmental
plasticity (within-individual vs. replicate individual designs), discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of each for investigating individual differences in the developmental
plasticity of personality traits, and explain why replicate individual designs provide better
estimates than within-individual designs of the potential developmental plasticity of
behavioral traits. More generally, we suggest that a Bayesian approach to development,
especially one which assumes that individuals differ with respect to the information
provided by their immediate and distant ancestors, can provide valuable insights into
how genes, epigenetic factors, maternal effects, and personal experiences might combine
across the lifetime to affect the development of personality and other behavioral traits.
Keywords: developmental plasticity, phenotypic plasticity, behavioral reaction norms, boldness, replicate
individuals, common garden, ontogeny, behavioral syndromes
INTRODUCTION
One of the defining criteria for personality in humans and ani-
mals is that individual differences in behavior are maintained
across time (Caspi et al., 2005; Reale et al., 2007; Stamps and
Groothuis, 2010a). The temporal consistency of individual dif-
ferences in behavior is described by differential consistency (also
called broad-sense repeatability, Stamps and Groothuis, 2010a).
Differential consistency indicates the extent to which individual
differences in trait values at one time are comparable to indi-
vidual differences in the same trait values at one or more later
times. Hence, it can be described by measuring the relation-
ship between behavior scores and time for different individuals
in the same sample. If the relationship between behavior and
age or time is similar for all of the individuals in a sample,
differential consistency will be high (Figure 1A); conversely, pro-
nounced differences between individuals in the slopes or shapes
of this relationship generate lower levels of differential con-
sistency (Figure 1B). If behavior is measured at two different
ages, differential consistency can be estimated by correlations,
across individuals, between their scores at the two ages (e.g.,
see Hayes and Jenkins, 1997). When behavior is measured at
multiple ages, specific versions of the statistic called repeatabil-
ity (R) may provide reasonable estimates of differential consis-
tency, as long as certain conditions are satisfied (McGraw and
Wong, 1996; Nakagawa and Schielzeth, 2010; Biro and Stamps,
under review).
Although the differential consistency of personality traits may
be high when behavior is measured over short periods of time,
it is often lower when measured over longer periods (Roberts
and Delvecchio, 2000; Caspi et al., 2005; Stamps and Groothuis,
2010a; Boulton et al., 2014; Riemer et al., 2014). Also, when dif-
ferential consistency is measured at different periods over the
lifetime, it often varies as a function of age. In some species,
the differential consistency of personality traits increases with
age, i.e., personality is more stable later in life than it is early in
life (squid, Sinn et al., 2008; humans, Roberts and Delvecchio,
2000; Caspi et al., 2005; dogs, Fratkin et al., 2013; fish, Edenbrow
and Croft, 2011). These observations raise the question of why
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FIGURE 1 | Differential consistency. (A) When differences among
individuals in behavior are maintained over age or time,
differential consistency (broad-sense repeatability) is high
(r = 0.94). (B) When differences among individuals in behavior
change over age or time, differential consistency is lower
(r = 0.37).
personality traits that are temporally stable over short periods
might be less so over ontogeny.
In free-living animals, one obvious reason why the temporal
stability of personality might change over ontogeny is that indi-
viduals had different experiences during the period in question.
It is clear that personality traits can change within individuals
as a result of past experience (Stamps and Groothuis, 2010a,b)
For instance, Madagascar hissing cockroaches (Gromphadorhina
portentosa) repeatedly exposed to predators over a 5 week period
eventually became shyer, on average, than comparable individu-
als with no such experience (McDermott et al., 2014). Hence, in
free-living animals, individual differences in behavior at a given
age could easily occur as a result of differences among them in
past experiences. However, this cannot be the whole story, because
changes in the differential consistency of personality traits over
time are observed even if all the subjects in a study are maintained
from birth or hatching in captivity under highly standardized
conditions (fish, Bell and Stamps, 2004; Edenbrow and Croft,
2011; squid, Sinn et al., 2008; insects, Gyuris et al., 2012; and
primates, Sussman and Ha, 2011). Situations in which the dif-
ferential consistency of personality changes over ontogeny, even
when every subject has been exposed to the same (or at least very
similar) experiential factors, imply that individuals differ with
respect to the effects of the same experience on their behavioral
development. In other words, changes in personality over time
could be due to individual differences in developmental plastic-
ity. More formally, in order to understand why personality might
change over time, we need to understand individual differences in
the developmental plasticity of personality traits. This is the topic
explored in the current article.
We use a recent Bayesian model of behavioral development
(Stamps and Krishnan, in press) to illustrate a number of basic
principles relevant to individual differences in the developmen-
tal plasticity of personality traits. We begin with definitions of
key concepts (i.e., behavioral developmental plasticity, potential,
and realized plasticity) and then describe experimental proto-
cols that empiricists have used to study individual differences in
the developmental plasticity of behavior. A brief outline of the
assumptions of the model is followed by a description of how
it can be used to predict individual differences in developmen-
tal trajectories and the changes in the differential consistency of
personality over ontogeny that result from those differences. We
then show how the model can be used to illustrate the distinc-
tion between the potential and realized developmental plasticity
of behavioral traits, and to show why relationships between ini-
tial scores for personality traits and the developmental plasticity
of those traits would be expected to vary as a function of the
cues to which individuals were exposed during ontogeny. Finally,
we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using different
experimental protocols to estimate differences across individu-
als in the developmental plasticity of behavioral and other traits.
We illustrate our main points by considering the development of
boldness, a personality trait that has been studied in a wide range
of animals, including humans (Fox et al., 2005; Reale et al., 2007;
Conrad et al., 2011).
DEFINITIONS
When applied to behavior, the terms “plasticity” and “develop-
mental plasticity” can be ambiguous because there are many
different ways in which behavior can vary within individuals or
genotypes as a result of variation in external stimuli (review in
Stamps, under review). Here, we follow a longstanding tradition
in ethology and psychology of discriminating between situations
in which behavior varies as an immediate response to changes
in external stimuli (contextual plasticity or activational plasticity)
and situations in which behavior varies as a function of changes
in external stimuli, experiences or environmental conditions that
occurred in the past (developmental plasticity) (Stamps and
Groothuis, 2010a; Snell-Rood, 2013). When applied to behavior,
the term developmental plasticity encompasses a very wide range
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of phenomena, including learning, acclimation, and life-cycle
staging (sensu Piersma and Drent, 2003), as well as situations in
which experiences early in life affect the behavior expressed later
in life. Since the current article is primarily concerned with grad-
ual changes in personality that occur over ontogeny, it focuses on
situations in which repeated or continuous exposure to specific
types of experiential factors over extended periods of time affect
the development and expression of personality traits.
When discussing the developmental plasticity of behavioral
traits, it is also important to distinguish between potential and
realized plasticity. Potential plasticity refers to the ability of an
individual or a genotype to change its phenotype in response to
changes in external stimuli, experiences, or environmental condi-
tions, while realized plasticity refers to the change in phenotype
that is actually observed when a given individual or genotype has
been exposed to a specific set of external stimuli, experiences or
environmental conditions (Stamps, under review). Potential plas-
ticity is a construct that is central to theories on the evolution
and ecological significance of individual differences in plasticity.
This is because theoreticians often assume that individuals with
high potential plasticity pay costs of maintaining the “machinery”
that allows them to detect, monitor and respond to different stim-
uli, and that these maintenance costs of plasticity are paid even if
the individual never expresses that plasticity (DeWitt et al., 1998;
Auld et al., 2010). In contrast, realized plasticity is what empiri-
cists actually measure in a given experiment. Concepts similar to
potential and realized plasticity have been mentioned in pass-
ing by other authors. For instance, Ydenberg and Prins (2012)
defined “flexibility” as the ability to adjust foraging behavior as
circumstances change, but then noted that flexible individuals
might not actually change their behavior if their original behav-
ior performed well under the new set of conditions. Similarly, a
recent theoretical model of the effects of phenotypic plasticity on
population dynamics distinguished between the range of pheno-
types that an individual is able to generate (plasticity-range), and
the extent to which an individual’s phenotype actually changes
in a given situation (plasticity-used) (Gomez-Mestre and Jovani,
2013).
Understandably, empiricists often assume that their estimates
of the realized plasticity of different individuals map directly
onto the potential plasticity of those individuals. For instance,
Thomson et al. (2012) found that initially shy rainbow trout
(Oncorhynchus mykiss) did not significantly alter their level of
boldness in response to a week’s exposure to cues from a preda-
tor, and interpreted their results as indicating that shy fish were
unable to respond to external cues. However, as we show below,
the extent to which estimates of realized developmental plastic-
ity reflect potential developmental plasticity can vary, depending
on the experimental design that is used to measure differences
among individuals or agents in developmental plasticity.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR STUDYING THE
DEVELOPMENTAL PLASTICITY OF PERSONALITY TRAITS
Two experimental designs have traditionally been used to study
the developmental plasticity of behavior: within-individual (or
longitudinal) designs, and “common garden” designs. In within-
individual designs, the behavior of the same agents is repeatedly
measured at different ages. If subjects are repeatedly measured
in the field, the resulting data simply describe how behavior of
individual animals and the differential consistency of the individ-
uals within the group changes as a function of age (e.g., Lucas
and Donnellan, 2011; Petelle et al., 2013). However, if subjects are
studied under carefully controlled conditions in the laboratory,
within-individual designs can be used to describe how specific
types of external stimuli, experiential factors, or environmen-
tal conditions affect the behavioral developmental trajectories of
each of the subjects.
Within-individual designs are routinely used to describe
individual differences in learning rates (Bell and Peeke, 2012;
Thornton and Lukas, 2012), but they can also be used to study
individual differences in other types of developmental plastic-
ity, including the developmental plasticity of personality. For
instance, by assessing the boldness of the same individuals before
and after a period of exposure to cues from predators, researchers
can use the difference between the two scores to estimate how
each subject’s boldness changed as a result of this experience
(Bell and Sih, 2007; Thomson et al., 2012; Frost et al., 2013).
Similarly, by repeatedly measuring the boldness of individuals
reared in a “safe” environment (i.e., raised without any cues from
predators, dangerous conspecifics, or other sources of danger),
researchers can describe how the boldness of individuals or geno-
types changes over the juvenile period as a function of this type of
experience (Edenbrow and Croft, 2011; Sussman and Ha, 2011).
In the simplest type of within-individual design, subjects are
consistently or repeatedly exposed to one set of cues or experi-
ential factors over the entire study period. A slightly more com-
plicated design involves first exposing subjects for an extended
period to one set of cues or experiences, and then exposing them
for a second extended period to a different set of cues or expe-
riences. We will consider how both of these within-individual
protocols can be used to study individual differences in the
developmental plasticity of personality traits.
The second important way to investigate individual differences
in developmental plasticity is to use a specific type of common
garden experimental design, referred to here as a “replicate indi-
vidual design.” In this version of a common garden experiment,
replicate individuals are used as surrogates for individual animals.
Replicate individuals are individuals with the same genotype (e.g.,
clones, isolines, ormore approximately, siblings), raised under the
same conditions prior to the beginning of an experiment (Stamps
andGroothuis, 2010a). Replicate individuals not only share genes,
but also important experiential factors (e.g., maternal or sibling
effects) that typically vary more among than within genotypes.
If such genotypes are derived from individuals randomly sam-
pled from the same population, and have not been subsequently
exposed to artificial selection, they can provide a powerful tool
for studies of individual differences in various types of behavioral
plasticities (Stamps, under review).
When replicate individuals are used to study behavioral devel-
opment, they allow researchers to estimate how the behavior of
each individual would have differed if that individual had been
exposed to different experiences earlier in life. To this end, indi-
viduals with the same age and genotype are randomly assigned to
different treatments. Then the individuals in each treatment are
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exposed to a different set of stimuli, experiential factors or envi-
ronmental conditions for a specified period of time. Finally, the
behavior of all of the subjects is measured using standard assays
at the same age later in life.
Replicate individual designs have, of course, been widely
used to study genotypic differences in the developmental plas-
ticity of morphological and life history traits (e.g., Auld et al.,
2010). However, they can also be used to describe differences
among genotypes in the developmental plasticity of behavior.
For instance, researchers have used replicate individual designs to
document differences among isolines of Drosophila melanogaster
in the effects of the larval rearing medium on adult responses to
olfactory stimuli (Sambandan et al., 2008), differences among iso-
lines ofD. simulans in the effects of rearing temperature on female
choosiness and mate preferences (Ingleby et al., 2013), and dif-
ferences among paternal half-sibs of waxmoths (Achroia grisella)
in the effects of density, temperature, and food levels during the
larval period on adult male calling song (Zhou et al., 2008).
MODEL DESCRIPTION
We only briefly summarize the main assumptions of the model
here, since details of the model are available elsewhere (Stamps
and Krishnan, in press). We assume that at the time of birth or
hatching, individuals already possess information about condi-
tions in the external world, information provided to them by their
distant ancestors (e.g., via genes, Leimar et al., 2006; Shea, 2007)
and by their immediate ancestors (e.g., via inherited epigenetic
factors and maternal effects, Uller, 2008; Shea et al., 2011; Keiser
and Mondor, 2013; Burton and Metcalfe, 2014). We assume that
at birth or hatching, different individuals in the same popula-
tion begin life with different information from their ancestors,
but that after birth or hatching, all individuals have the same
personal experiences, which also provide them with informa-
tion about conditions in the external world. The key assumption
of our model is that, within each individual, information from
its ancestors and information from a series of personal experi-
ences is combined over ontogeny through Bayesian-like processes
to affect behavior. The model focuses on personal experiences
(cues) that provide information about the external world but do
not directly affect the resources available for growth and devel-
opment. For instance, it would apply to experiments in which
animals were repeatedly exposed to stimuli from predators or
conspecifics, but not to experiments in which the “experience”
consisted of restricted food rations or infection by pathogens.
As is the case for any Bayesian model of behavior, our
model includes four basic components: prior distributions, pos-
terior distributions, likelihood functions and response functions.
Informally, a prior distribution specifies an individual’s beliefs
about a biologically relevant variable (e.g., the state of danger)
before it has a given experience (e.g., exposure to cues from a
predator), and a posterior distribution specifies that individual’s
beliefs about that same variable after it has had that experience.
The likelihood function for a particular type of experience spec-
ifies the probability that that experience would occur, given each
possible state of the variable; the response function links belief to
action, by specifying the relationship between an individual’s cur-
rent belief (based on its prior or its posterior distribution) and
the behavior it expresses based on that belief. Importantly, the
posterior distribution after one experience becomes the prior dis-
tribution for the next experience. This is why Bayesian approaches
are useful for modeling development, where it is typical for a
given individual to have a series of experiences over ontogeny,
each of which may provide additional information about the state
of the world (Frankenhuis and Panchanathan, 2011a,b; Fischer
et al., 2014).
The current model assumes that at birth or hatching, individ-
uals have different prior distributions, and that both the variable
that individuals are attempting to estimate in the external envi-
ronment (e.g., the state of danger) and the individuals’ behavioral
response to that estimate (e.g., their level of boldness) are contin-
uously distributed.When combined, these two assumptions allow
us to model personality traits, which may be expressed soon after
birth or hatching, and which usually vary continuously across
individuals within populations. These assumptions set our model
apart from other recent Bayesian models of development, which
assume that (1) all of the individuals in a population are born
with the same prior distribution, (2) the variable in the exter-
nal world that animals are attempting to estimate can take on
one of only two different states, and (3) there are only two phe-
notypes, each of which is favored in one of the two states (e.g.,
Frankenhuis and Panchanathan, 2011a; Fischer et al., 2014). In
addition, our assumption that prior and posterior distributions
are continuously distributed allows the means and the variances
of these distributions to vary independently of one another (see
below, Appendix and Discussion); this is not an option in two-
state models, since in binomial distributions, the variance is a
fixed function of the mean.
In our model, we assume that the variable in the external envi-
ronment (here, the state of danger) varies continuously from 0 to
1 (we divide the interval from 0 to 1 into 100 equally spaced states
for ease of numerical computation), and use beta distributions
to describe both prior distributions and likelihood functions.
Beta distributions use two parameters (α and β) to generate a
wide variety of monotonically increasing, monotonically decreas-
ing, unimodal (hump-shaped), and uniform distributions. We
do not, however, consider U-shaped prior distributions or like-
lihood functions (α < 1 and β < 1), in which extremely high
and extremely low values of the variable are both more likely to
occur than any intermediate values of the variable. This is because
situations in which both extreme values of a variable are more
likely to occur than any intermediate value are more easily and
appropriately modeled using two-state rather than multiple-state
Bayesian models.
We focus on likelihood functions with intermediate reliability,
where the term reliability indicates the extent to which a given
cue is associated with different states of the variable. With respect
to the current model, a cue with the lowest reliability would be
one that was equally likely to occur at any of the 100 states of
danger, while a cue with the highest reliability would be one that
was only likely to occur at only one of the 100 states of danger.
Cues with moderately reliable likelihood functions are most rel-
evant for studying the development of personality because cues
with very low reliability have little effect on the behavior of any
individual, while cues with very high reliability encourage every
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individual to rapidly develop the same phenotype (Frankenhuis
and Panchanathan, 2011a; Fischer et al., 2014), even if those
individuals began with different prior distributions (Stamps and
Krishnan, in press).
For simplicity, in this article we focus on linear response func-
tions (for discussion of other response functions, see Stamps and
Krishnan, in press). That is, we assume that there is a linear
relationship between the mean of the prior or posterior distri-
bution at a given age and the mean level of behavior expressed
by an individual at that age. Depending on the variable and the
behavior, this relationship can be positive or negative. We assume
that the level of boldness exhibited by an individual is negatively
related to its current estimate of the state of danger (see also
Appendix).
In order to investigate how individuals with a range of prior
distributions would respond to experiences with different like-
lihood functions, we use Matlab to model the developmental
trajectories of 15 hypothetical individuals, each of which has a
different prior distribution for the state of danger. Each individ-
ual’s prior distribution is described by its mean (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7,
and 0.9) and its variance (0.001, 0.02, and the maximum variance
possible for the mean value, given the constraints on the beta dis-
tributions noted above). Themaximumpossible variance for each
prior distribution depends on its mean value. For instance, for
prior distributions with a mean of 0.1 or 0.9, the maximum vari-
ance= 0.0426; whereas for prior distributions with a mean of 0.3
or 0.7, the maximum variance = 0.0864. For a prior distribution
with a mean of 0.5, the maximum variance = 0.0833; this is the
special case of a uniform distribution (α = 1, β = 1), in which
each of the 100 possible states is equally likely to occur. Together,
these 15 distributions span the range of prior distributions that
are possible under the assumptions of our model.
We assume that each of the 15 individuals begins with a differ-
ent prior distribution at birth or hatching (at age 0), and that the
behavior expressed by each individual at age 0 is directly related
to the mean of its prior distribution. Then all of the individu-
als are exposed to the same cues (same likelihood function) from
age 0 to age 1. Each individual’s posterior distribution at age 1
is computed by combining its prior distribution with the likeli-
hood function using Bayes’ equation, and its behavior at age 1 is
assumed to be directly related to the mean of its posterior distri-
bution at age 1. Each individual’s posterior distribution at age 1
then becomes its prior distribution for the next experience (from
age 1 to age 2). The procedure outlined above is then repeated to
generate the posterior distributions and the expected behavior of
each individual for each age from 2 to 4, as a function of their
prior distributions at birth or hatching, and the likelihood func-
tions for the cues to which they were exposed over the course of
ontogeny.
Previous analyses have shown that when prior distributions are
continuously distributed, the effects of a given cue (i.e., a given
likelihood function) on the development of behavior depend on
the mean and the variance of the prior distribution (Stamps
and Krishnan, in press). If a prior distribution has low variance,
behavior is not expected to change much, if at all, after any cue,
regardless of the mean of the prior distribution or the shape of the
likelihood function. In contrast, if a prior distribution has high
variance, the extent to which a given cue affects behavior depends
on the discrepancy between the mean of the prior distribution
and the information about the state provided by the likelihood
function. An intuitive explanation for these patterns is provided
in the Appendix; see also Results.
RESULTS
WITHIN-INDIVIDUAL DESIGNS FOR DESCRIBING THE
DEVELOPMENTAL PLASTICITY OF PERSONALITY TRAITS AS A
FUNCTION OF EXPERIENCE
Repeated exposure to cues with the same likelihood function
In this section, we assume that individuals with 15 different prior
distributions for the state of danger are continuously or repeat-
edly exposed to the same cues (same likelihood function) from
birth or hatching until the end of the juvenile period (see also
Stamps and Krishnan, in press). The boldness of each individual
is assessed soon after birth, and then again at a series of different
ages. The developmental plasticity of boldness of each individual
can then be estimated by the slope or shape of its developmental
trajectory, either for a portion of ontogeny (e.g., from age 0 to age
1) or across the entire study period (e.g., from age 0 to age 4).
In the current study, we compare the results from three sim-
ulated experiments, in which a set of individuals with the same
initial prior distributions are either repeatedly exposed to cues
indicating that level of danger in the current environment is rel-
atively low (Figure 2), to cues indicating that the level of danger
is relatively high (Figure 3), or to cues indicating that the level of
danger is intermediate (Figure 4).
In all three situations, scores for boldness tend to converge on
the level of boldness that is encouraged by the likelihood function.
That is, if cues indicate that the state of danger is low (Figure 2),
most individuals gradually become bolder, if cues indicate that the
state of danger is high, most individuals gradually become shyer
(Figure 3), and if cues indicate that the state of danger is interme-
diate (Figure 4), most shy individuals gradually become bolder
and most bold individuals gradually become shyer.
The variance and mean of each individual’s prior distribution
together determine how it will respond to a given cue. Individuals
whose prior distributions had low variance (indicated by circles)
maintain their initial level of boldness across ontogeny, regard-
less of the cues to which they are exposed. For instance, initially
shy individuals whose prior distributions had low variance (red
circles) remain shy, even if repeatedly exposed to cues indicating
that the world is safe (Figure 2). In contrast, if individuals’ prior
distributions had high variance (indicated by triangles), their
developmental trajectories depend on the relationship between
the mean of their prior distribution and the likelihood function
for the cue. An individual who was very shy at birth but whose
prior distribution had a high variance (red triangles) becomes
much bolder over ontogeny if raised with cues indicating that
the world is relatively safe (Figure 2), remains shy over ontogeny
if raised with cues indicating that the world is relatively dan-
gerous (Figure 3), and becomes somewhat bolder if raised with
cues indicating that the world is moderately safe (Figure 4). Of
course, individuals can have prior distributions with variance
anywhere between these two extremes: predicted developmen-
tal trajectories for individuals whose prior distributions had an
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FIGURE 2 | Developmental trajectories for boldness resulting from
repeated exposure to cues indicative of safety. Fifteen hypothetical
individuals with different prior distributions at birth are repeatedly exposed to
the same cue, and their boldness is recorded at 5 ages across ontogeny. The
mean of each prior distribution (and the resulting mean level of behavior at
age 0) is indicated by color (red: 0.1, blue: 0.3, green: 0.5, magenta: 0.7, black:
0.9); the variance of each prior distribution is indicated by symbols (circles:
variance = 0.001, squares, variance = 0.02; triangles, variance = maximal
variance for each mean). The likelihood function (right box) indicates the
probability of experience given the state (P (Exp|State) for each of the 100
possible states, ranging from 0 to 1. This likelihood function is moderately
reliable and left-biased (i.e., the cue is more likely to occur when danger is
low than when danger is moderate to high); it was generated by a beta
distribution in which α = 2 and β = 1.
FIGURE 3 | Developmental trajectories for boldness resulting from repeated exposure to a moderately reliable cue indicative of danger. Symbols for
prior distributions as in Figure 2. The likelihood function (right box) was generated by a beta distribution with α = 1 and β = 2.
intermediate variance of 0.02 are indicated by the lines with
squares in Figures 2–4.
These predicted differences among individuals in their devel-
opmental trajectories for boldness follow directly from basic
principles of Bayesian updating (see Appendix). Low variance
for its prior distribution implies that, at birth, an individual is
quite certain that the estimate of the state of danger provided
by its ancestors is correct. Hence, the individual would continue
to express the level of boldness encouraged by its prior distri-
bution, even if repeatedly exposed to moderately reliable cues
that imply that its initial level of boldness might not be appro-
priate in the current environment. In contrast, high variance
for a prior distribution indicates that, at birth, an individual
is very uncertain that the estimate of the state provided by its
ancestors is correct. In that case, repeated exposure to moder-
ately reliable cues can lead to a change in the level of boldness
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FIGURE 4 | Developmental trajectories for boldness resulting from repeated exposure to a moderately reliable cue indicative of intermediate levels of
danger. Symbols for prior distributions as in Figure 2. The likelihood function (right box) was generated by a beta distribution with α = 1.75 and β = 1.75.
over ontogeny, but the extent to which behavior changes over
time depends on the discrepancy between the estimate of the
state of danger provided by the cue and the estimate of the
state of danger provided by information from the individual’s
ancestors.
These patterns also provide a possible explanation for changes
in the differential consistency of personality over ontogeny. The
differential consistency of boldness for a given period (e.g., from
age 0 to age 1) can be estimated by measuring the slope of each
individual’s developmental trajectory, and then quantifying the
extent to which those slopes differ across the 15 individuals in
the group. It can be easily seen that in Figures 2–4, the slopes of
the developmental trajectories differ more across individuals ear-
lier in life (from age 0 to age 1) than they do later in life (from
age 3 to age 4). In other words, in the examples illustrated here,
the model predicts that the differential consistency of personality
will increase with age. Previous analyses indicate that differen-
tial consistency would increase with age for many other, though
not all, likelihood functions and response functions (Stamps and
Krishnan, in press; unpublished data).
In addition, the model predicts that relationships among indi-
viduals between personality traits and the developmental plastic-
ity of those traits will vary, depending on the cues to which those
individuals were exposed over ontogeny. More formally, across
individuals, the relationship between initial scores for behav-
ior (i.e., the intercepts of the development trajectories) and the
absolute value (magnitude) of the slopes of the developmental
trajectories depends on the likelihood function. For instance, in
Figure 2, individuals with high initial scores are less plastic than
individuals with low initial scores, as is indicated by the negative
relationship across individuals between intercepts and the magni-
tude of the slopes across the entire study period (from age 0 to age
4). In contrast, in Figure 3, individuals with high initial scores are
more plastic than those with low initial scores (a positive relation-
ship, across individuals, between intercepts and the magnitude of
the slopes), while in Figure 4, the relationship between intercept
and the magnitude of the slopes is U-shaped: bold individuals
become shyer, shy individuals become bolder, and intermediately
bold individuals maintain their initial levels of behavior.
Finally, these results provide an easy way to grasp the dis-
tinction between potential plasticity and realized plasticity. The
model indicates that the variance of an individual’s prior distribu-
tion is directly related to its potential plasticity. Individuals whose
prior distributions had low variance have low potential develop-
mental plasticity, in the sense that they would not be expected
to change their behavior much, if at all, in response to exposure
to any cue over the course of development. In contrast, indi-
viduals whose prior distributions had high variance have high
potential plasticity, because they are capable of major changes in
behavior as a function of exposure to cues during development.
Individuals whose prior distributions had intermediate variance
have intermediate potential plasticity: they are able to change
their behavior as a result of exposure to cues, but to a lesser extent
for any given cue than individuals whose prior distributions had
high variance.
However, it is also clear from comparison of Figures 2–4 that
individuals with high potential plasticity do not necessarily always
exhibit high realized plasticity. Instead, individuals whose prior
distributions had high variance may express low realized plas-
ticity, intermediate realized plasticity, or high realized plasticity,
depending on the extent to which the estimate of the state pro-
vided by their prior distribution contradicts the estimate of the
state provided by the cues to which they are exposed. For instance,
a potentially plastic individual who initially estimated that the
state of danger is intermediate (green triangles) would not be
expected to change its level of boldness over ontogeny if exposed
to cues that confirmed this initial estimate (Figure 4), but would
be expected to either increase or decrease its level of boldness
if exposed over ontogeny to cues that contradicted this initial
estimate (Figures 2, 3).
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Sequential exposure to cues with opposing likelihood functions
In this section we consider a slightly more complicated situa-
tion, in which individuals are first exposed to one cue (with
one likelihood function) for an extended period over ontogeny
and then are exposed to a different cue (with a different like-
lihood function) for a second extended period. We focus on
situations in which the likelihood functions are biased in different
directions, because if different cues or experiences have simi-
lar likelihood functions, they are predicted to have comparable
effects on developmental trajectories.
In the first example (Figure 5A), individuals born with a range
of prior distributions are first exposed from age 0 to age 2 to a cue
with a moderately reliable left-biased likelihood function (i.e., a
cue that indicates that the state of danger is relatively low) and are
then exposed from age 2 to age 4 to a different moderately reliable
cue with a right-biased likelihood function (i.e., a cue indicating
that the state of danger is relatively high). As one would expect,
across all of the subjects, average boldness first gradually increases
when individuals are exposed to cues indicative of safety, and then
average boldness gradually declines when individuals are exposed
to cues indicative of danger. Also, as one would expect from the
discussion in the previous section, individuals with low potential
plasticity (prior distributions with low variance) do not change
their behavior in response to either type of experience.
However, some of the other patterns illustrated in Figure 5A
are less intuitive. For instance, even though both likelihood func-
tions are equally informative (same shape, albeit biased in oppo-
site directions, see boxes in Figures 2, 3), following exposure to
both cues, individuals with moderate to high potential plastic-
ity do not end up with the same level of boldness that they had
at birth or hatching (at age 0). Instead, scores for boldness tend
to converge on the intermediate values that are appropriate for
both likelihood functions. And, despite the change in cues and
likelihood functions midway through ontogeny, differential con-
sistency tends to increase as a function of age: the variance across
individuals in the slopes of their developmental trajectories is
higher from age 0 to age 1 than it is from age 3 to age 4. Thus,
several of the patterns expected when individuals are exposed to
a single cue through ontogeny are also observed if cues reverse
midway through ontogeny.
With respect to providing reasonable estimates of potential
developmental plasticity, the sequential within-individual design
does a better job than a simpler experimental protocol in which
individuals are exposed to just one cue over ontogeny. This is
because individuals with high potential plasticity whose behav-
ior is unaffected by initial exposure to a cue with a likelihood
function biased in one direction would be expected to change
their behavior when exposed to a different cue with a likelihood
function biased in the opposite direction. For instance, the poten-
tially plastic “bold” individual indicated by the black triangles in
Figure 5A maintains its initial level of high boldness (low realized
plasticity) as long as it is exposed to cues indicative of safety, but
subsequently reduces its level of boldness (high realized plasticity)
when it is repeatedly exposed to cues indicative of danger.
However, one problem with using sequential within-
individual designs to estimate potential plasticity is that the order
in which individuals are exposed to each of a series of cues affects
their responses to those cues. This can be seen easily by using
the range of scores each individual expresses over ontogeny to
estimate its realized plasticity. For instance, in Figure 5A, the
individual indicated by the red triangles has scores which range
from a minimum of 0.1 to a maximum of 0.68 over the period
from age 0 to age 4, so it has higher realized plasticity than the
individual indicated by the blue squares, whose scores range
from 0.3 to 0.4 over the same period. By extension, we can use
this method to compare the realized plasticity of individuals
FIGURE 5 | Sequential exposure to cues with different likelihood
functions. (A) Fifteen hypothetical individuals are first exposed from
age 0 to age 2 to cues indicating that the world is relatively safe
(see box in Figure 2), then are exposed from age 2 to age 4 to
cues indicating that the world is relatively dangerous (see box in
Figure 3). (B) Individuals with the same prior distributions are first
exposed from age 0 to age 2 to cues indicating that the world is
relatively dangerous (box, Figure 3), then to cues indicating that the
world is relatively safe (box, Figure 2). Symbols for prior distributions
as in Figure 2.
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with the same prior distribution who were sequentially exposed
to the same two cues, but in a different order (Figure 5A vs.
Figure 5B). This process shows that the realized plasticity of
equivalent individuals depends on the order in which they were
exposed to the same cues. For instance, the initially shy individual
indicated by the red triangles is more plastic in Figure 5A (range
of boldness scores: 0.1–0.68) than is the equivalent individual in
Figure 5B (range of scores: 0.05–0.42). As a result of these dif-
ferences, the rank-order of realized plasticity for the individuals
in the two groups varies as a function of cue order. For example,
the individual with the highest realized plasticity in Figure 5A is
the initially shy individual indicated by the red triangles, but the
individual with the highest realized plasticity in Figure 5B is the
initially bold individual indicated by the black triangles.
The order in which individuals are sequentially exposed to
cues over ontogeny affects their realized plasticity because, by its
very nature, Bayesian updating incorporates information from
the past when estimating the current state of the world (see
Appendix, and references on Bayesian updating in Stamps and
Krishnan, in press). The notion that order matters when subjects
are sequentially exposed to different cues or experiences is quite
familiar to empiricists studying another type of developmental
plasticity, learning. For instance, in reversal learning experiments,
acquisition rates for the first response in the sequence are often
different from the acquisition rates for the second response, fol-
lowing the change in the task contingency (e.g., Colwill et al.,
2005; Moy et al., 2007; Shettleworth, 2010; Lloyd and Leslie,
2013).
The fact that order matters when individuals are exposed
to different cues over ontogeny implies that although sequen-
tial within-individual designs provide better estimates of poten-
tial developmental plasticity than within-individual designs that
only utilize one cue, there may still be substantial discrepancies
between the estimates of realized developmental plasticity pro-
vided by this method and the potential plasticity of the subjects.
REPLICATE INDIVIDUAL DESIGNS
Common garden experiments using replicate individuals as sub-
jects (i.e., replicate individual designs) measure developmental
plasticity differently than is the case for within-individual (lon-
gitudinal) experimental designs. Instead of describing how the
behavior of each individual changes over time as a function of
exposure to a given experience (or sequence of experiences), the
scores of matched individuals who have been exposed to differ-
ent experiences over the same period of time are compared to one
another.
A little thought reveals that replicate individual designs are
equivalent to simultaneously conducting two or more of the
experiments outlined above, except that in this case, the subjects
are genotypes (replicate individuals) rather than individual ani-
mals. For instance, imagine that one set of representatives of 15
genotypes were raised in the presence of cues indicative of safety
(Figure 2), and a second matched set of the same genotypes were
raised in the presence of cues indicative of danger (Figure 3).
Then, at age 4, boldness is assessed for each of the subjects in
each treatment. The resulting data could then be used to esti-
mate each genotype’s developmental response to each set of cues,
FIGURE 6 | A hypothetical common garden experiment showing how
exposure to cues in two different rearing treatments might affect the
boldness of 15 genotypes (replicate individuals). Genotypes with the
prior distributions specified by the symbols in Figure 2 are either raised
with cues indicative of safety (see Figure 2) or with cues indicative of
danger (see Figure 3). The mean boldness scores at age 4 are compared
for the two treatment groups. Realized developmental plasticity is lowest
for genotypes whose prior distributions had low variance (circles),
intermediate for genotypes whose prior distributions had intermediate
variance (squares) and highest for genotypes whose prior distributions had
high variance (triangles).
as indicated in Figure 6. Note that instead of plotting the behav-
ior of each agent as a function of age or time, we now plot the
mean behavior of each genotype at age 4, as a function of the
cues to which they were exposed earlier in life: treatment 1 (reared
with cues indicative of safety), vs. treatment 2 (reared with cues
indicative of danger).
In the simplest replicate individual design, in which matched
genotypes are raised in two different treatments and their trait
values are compared at the end of the study, the plasticity of each
genotype is indicated by the difference between its scores in the
two treatments (see Auld et al., 2010). It can be seen that this
procedure provides reasonable estimates of the potential plastic-
ity of the 15 genotypes in this study (Figure 6). Genotypes whose
prior distributions had low variance (circles) have low plastic-
ity: there is little or no difference in their scores at age 4 after
being reared in the two treatments. Genotypes whose prior dis-
tributions had intermediate variance (squares) have moderately
lower boldness scores after treatment 2 than after treatment 1,
while genotypes whose prior distributions had high variance (tri-
angles) have much lower boldness scores after treatment 2 than
after treatment 1.
Generally speaking, replicate individual designs have several
advantages over within-individual designs with respect to esti-
mating the potential developmental plasticity of different agents.
Because individuals with the same genotype can be exposed over
ontogeny to two (or more) different treatments, individuals with
high potential plasticity are expected to change their behavior in
response to at least one of them. This is in contrast to the situation
www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 2 | Article 69 | 9
Stamps and Krishnan Developmental plasticity of personality
when subjects are exposed to just one cue throughout the experi-
ment, since in the latter situation individuals with high potential
plasticity may have low realized plasticity if raised with cues that
indicate that their initial phenotype was appropriate for the cur-
rent environment. And, because each set of replicate individuals
is reared under a single set of conditions, the order effects that
can complicate sequential, within-individual designs are not a
concern in replicate individual designs.
On the other hand, information about temporal change in
behavior is lost in traditional replicate individual designs. This
is because in such designs, the behavior of the different replicate
individuals is typically not measured soon after birth or hatching,
so there is no way to estimate the extent to which the behavior
of each agent changed over ontogeny. Of course, there are also a
number of practical issues with replicate individual designs, e.g.,
replicate individuals are more readily available in some species
than others, and because behavior can vary among individuals
with the same genotype, large numbers of individuals per geno-
type may be required to obtain reliable estimates of the behavior
of each genotype. These issues are discussed in more detail in
Stamps, under review.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The current article shows that a simple Bayesian model can be
very useful for illustrating concepts relevant to the development
of personality. It explains why one would expect to see individual
differences in the developmental trajectories of personality traits
and changes in the differential consistency of personality over
ontogeny, even if every subject was raised under the same set of
conditions. It shows why we would expect relationships between
initial personality scores and the developmental plasticity of per-
sonality to vary among empirical studies, as a function of the
cues to which those subjects were exposed during those studies.
More broadly, it highlights the distinction between realized and
potential plasticity, and indicates why certain experimental proto-
cols for studying the developmental plasticity of behavioral traits
might provide better estimates than others of the potential plas-
ticity of different individuals or genotypes. In addition, the model
may have practical value, in terms of predicting the developmen-
tal trajectories of personality traits of individuals or genotypes.
This topic is explored in greater detail in Stamps and Krishnan
(in press), which discusses ways to estimate the mean and vari-
ance of an agent’s prior distribution, based on the mean level of
behavior, and the short-term spontaneous variability of behavior
(intra-individual variability (IIV), or intra-genotypic variability)
that it expresses soon after birth or hatching.
Another insight from the model is that different experimental
designs provide different information about individual differ-
ences in the developmental plasticity of behavioral traits. Within-
individual (longitudinal) designs provide the data required to
describe individual developmental trajectories and changes in
the differential consistency of behavioral traits over ontogeny,
but they provide less reliable estimates of the potential plasticity
of different individuals or genotypes than do replicate individ-
ual designs. Conversely, although traditional replicate individual
designs can provide reasonable estimates of the potential plas-
ticity of different replicate individuals (genotypes), they don’t
provide information about how personality changes as a function
of age. In species and situations in which replicate experimen-
tal designs are impractical, our analyses suggest that sequential
within-individual designs (in which cues switch midway through
ontogeny) are more likely to provide reasonable estimates of
potential plasticity than are within-individual designs in which
the subjects are reared with the same cues throughout ontogeny.
In species and situations in which replicate individual designs
are feasible, we suggest using hybrid experimental designs, i.e.,
common garden experiments in which the behavior of the sub-
jects is measured before they are placed in the different treatment
groups, and then measured again at regular intervals over the
study (e.g., Edenbrow and Croft, 2013). With sufficient statistical
power, this type of hybrid design can not only provide estimates of
the potential plasticity of different replicate individuals, but also
provide estimates of the shapes or the slopes of their behavioral
developmental trajectories.
Although experimental studies of individual differences in the
developmental trajectories of personality traits are still quite lim-
ited, there is some support for the model’s general prediction that
relationships between initial scores for personality traits and the
subsequent plasticity of those traits might vary as a function of
the cues to which individuals were exposed over ontogeny. For
instance, when pigtailedmacaques,Macaca nemestrina and clones
(genotypes) of Mangrove killifish, Kryptolebias marmoratus were
raised in the absence of cues indicative of danger, the average
boldness of juveniles increased with age, but across individuals
or genotypes, shy individuals became bolder and bold individu-
als remained relatively bold (Edenbrow and Croft, 2011; Sussman
and Ha, 2011). Thus, the intercepts and the magnitude of the
slopes of developmental trajectories for boldness were negatively
related to one another, as predicted by the model (see Figure 2,
also Stamps and Krishnan, in press). In contrast, when juvenile
rainbow trout, Oncorhynchus mykiss, were repeatedly exposed to
predators over a 2 week period, there was no change in their
average boldness, but bold individuals became shyer, and shy
individuals become bolder (Frost et al., 2013). This is the pat-
tern predicted by our model if individuals with different initial
levels of boldness were repeatedly exposed to cues indicative of
an intermediate level of danger (e.g., see Figure 4). To our knowl-
edge, to date no one has described the developmental trajectories
for boldness for individuals or genotypes who initially expressed
different levels of boldness, and who were then repeatedly or con-
tinuously exposed to cues indicative of high levels of danger. In
this situation, our model predicts a decline in average boldness
over ontogeny, and a positive relationship, across agents, between
the intercepts and the magnitude of the slopes of developmental
trajectories for boldness (e.g., see Figure 3).
Although boldness was used to illustrate the main points
of this study, the same approach could be used to model the
development of other personality traits (e.g., activity, exploratory
behavior, aggressiveness). Similarly, although we have focused on
cues that might affect individuals’ estimates of the state of dan-
ger, cues associated with other variables in the external world
(e.g., local population density, food availability, etc.) might also
affect the development of personality traits. In principle, the gen-
eral approach outlined in the current study could apply to any
Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution | Behavioral and Evolutionary Ecology October 2014 | Volume 2 | Article 69 | 10
Stamps and Krishnan Developmental plasticity of personality
continuously variable labile behavioral or physiological trait. In
practice, the major challenge for empiricists will be to begin their
experiments already armed with reasonable assumptions about
the likelihood functions for specific cues, and about the response
functions that link prior distributions or posterior distributions
with behavior.
In the current article we were able to build upon an exten-
sive literature that indicates that cues from predators (or the
lack thereof) convey information about the state of danger, and
that levels of boldness should decline as estimates of the state of
danger increase. However, it is not always obvious how behav-
ior should change over ontogeny in response to continuous or
repeated exposure to a given cue. For instance, there is empirical
evidence that juvenile crickets use repeated exposure to acoustic
signals from adult males to estimate the type of social environ-
ment they will later encounter as adults (see Bailey and Zuk,
2008; Kasumovic et al., 2011; DiRienzo et al., 2012). However,
it is currently unclear how exposure to those cues should affect
the development of aggressive behavior. Some authors have sug-
gested that exposure to cues indicative of high densities of local
competitors should favor the development of elevated levels of
aggressiveness in male crickets (e.g., see DiRienzo et al., 2012).
But cues indicating that the local neighborhood already con-
tains many older, vigorously calling, territory owners might just
as easily favor the development of reduced aggressiveness and
enhanced subordinate behavior in callow, youngmales. This alter-
nate hypothesis is suggested by empirical studies indicating that
newly mature male crickets have difficulty competing aggressively
with older, established territorial residents (e.g., Dixon and Cade,
1986; Buena andWalker, 2008; Rillich et al., 2011). In fact, prelim-
inary results support the second hypothesis: male Gryllus integer
reared with conspecific calls exhibited lower levels of aggres-
siveness as adults in standardized staged encounters than did
males reared without them (DiRienzo et al., 2012). Hence, until
more is known about the levels of aggressiveness favored when
young male crickets emerge in localities with different densities
of older, established territory owners, it would be premature to
construct theoretical models based on assumptions about the
effects of conspecific calls on the development of aggressiveness
in this taxon.
Many of the assumptions which underlie the current study
are not new, and can be found scattered among different lit-
eratures. These include (1) there is standing genetic variation
within populations, not only in behavioral trait values but also
in the potential plasticity of those traits (Wolf et al., 2008, 2011;
Rodriguez, 2013), (2) information provided by parents about
the environment can affect the development of personality traits
(Reddon, 2012; Schuett et al., 2013), (3) information from ances-
tors and from personal experiences combines across ontogeny to
affect the development of phenotypic traits (Leimar et al., 2006;
Frankenhuis and Panchanathan, 2011a; Fischer et al., 2014), and
(4) Bayesian-like mechanisms provide the optimal way to com-
bine information from different sources (McLinn and Stephens,
2006; McNamara et al., 2006; Lange and Dukas, 2009). Our main
contribution has been to combine these assumptions to generate
predictions about individual differences in the developmental tra-
jectories of continuously distributed phenotypic traits. One of the
major insights to be gleaned from this approach is that variation
among individuals and genotypes in the reliability of information
provided by their ancestors may play as important a role as the
reliability of information from personal experiences in determin-
ing how a given individual or genotype will respond to exposure
to a given type of experience over the course of development.
That is, our model suggests that an individual who assumes that
the information from its ancestors is highly reliable (i.e., a prior
distribution with low variance) would have lower potential plas-
ticity than an individual who assumes that the information from
its ancestors is less reliable (i.e., a prior distribution with high
variance). Thus, our approach complements earlier theoretical
studies which indicate that developmental plasticity can be lim-
ited by the reliability of the cues to which individuals are exposed
over ontogeny (DeWitt et al., 1998; Tufto, 2000; Frankenhuis and
Panchanathan, 2011a; Fischer et al., 2014). It expands upon those
findings to show that even if every subject is exposed to the same
(moderately reliable) cues over ontogeny, individual differences
in developmental trajectories would still be expected if neonates
start out with different information from their ancestors, a situa-
tion which is likely to be common in the natural world (Stamps
and Krishnan, in press).
More generally, we suggest that a Bayesian perspective can
be helpful for understanding a number of difficult concepts in
development. It shows how genes, maternal effects, and personal
experiences might iteratively interact with one another across
ontogeny to affect the expression of behavior and other phe-
notypic traits (see also Oyama, 2000; Bateson and Gluckman,
2011). It emphasizes that information about the same state of
the world can come from many different sources, at many dif-
ferent times across an individual’s lifetime, and that information
from genes does not have precedence over information from other
sources (see Lickliter, 2008). It demonstrates that information
from ancestors can continue to affect an individual’s develop-
mental trajectory, even after that individual has had a series of
informative personal experiences, and suggests why some individ-
uals might be more sensitive than others to the effects of the same
experiential factors on their developmental trajectories. Hence, a
Bayesian approach to development may have value that extends
well beyond the specific questions addressed in the current study.
REFERENCES
Auld, J. R., Agrawal, A. A., and Relyea, R. A. (2010). Re-evaluating the costs and lim-
its of adaptive phenotypic plasticity. Proc. R. Soc. B 277, 503–511. doi: 10.1098/
rspb.2009.1355
Bailey, N. W., and Zuk, M. (2008). Acoustic experience shapes female mate choice
in field crickets. Proc. R. Soc. B 275, 2645–2650. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2008.0859
Bateson, P., and Gluckman, P. (2011). Plasticity, Robustness, Development and
Evolution. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780
511842382
Bell, A. M., and Peeke, H. V. S. (2012). Individual variation in habitua-
tion: behaviour over time toward different stimuli in threespine sticklebacks
(Gasterosteus aculeatus). Behaviour 149, 1339–1365. doi: 10.1163/1568539X-
00003019
Bell, A. M., and Sih, A. (2007). Exposure to predation generates personality in
threespined sticklebacks (Gasterosteus aculeatus). Ecol. Lett. 10, 828–834. doi:
10.1111/j.1461-0248.2007.01081.x
Bell, A. M., and Stamps, J. A. (2004). Development of behavioural differences
between individuals and populations of sticklebacks, Gasterosteus aculeatus.
Anim. Behav. 68, 1339–1348. doi: 10.1016/j.anbehav.2004.05.007
www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 2 | Article 69 | 11
Stamps and Krishnan Developmental plasticity of personality
Boulton, K., Grimmer, A. J., Rosenthal, G. G., Walling, C. A., and Wilson, A. J.
(2014). How stable are personalities? A multivariate view of behavioural varia-
tion over long and short timescales in the sheepshead swordtail, Xiphophorus
birchmanni. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. 68, 791–803. doi: 10.1007/s00265-014-
1692-0
Buena, L. J., and Walker, S. E. (2008). Information asymmetry and aggressive
behaviour in male house crickets, Acheta domesticus. Anim. Behav. 75, 199–204.
doi: 10.1016/j.anbehav.2007.04.027
Burton, T., and Metcalfe, N. B. (2014). Can environmental conditions experienced
in early life influence future generations? Proc. R. Soc. B 281:20140311. doi:
10.1098/rspb.2014.0311
Caspi, A., Roberts, B. W., and Shiner, R. L. (2005). Personality development: stabil-
ity and change. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 56, 453–484. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.55.
090902.141913
Colwill, R. M., Raymond, M. P., Ferreira, L., and Escudero, H. (2005). Visual dis-
crimination learning in zebrafish (Danio rerio). Behav. Processes 70, 19–31. doi:
10.1016/j.beproc.2005.03.001
Conrad, J. L., Weinersmith, K. L., Brodin, T., Saltz, J. B., and Sih, A. (2011).
Behavioural syndromes in fishes: a review with implications for ecology and
fisheries management. J. Fish Biol. 78, 395–435. doi: 10.1111/j.1095-8649.2010.
02874.x
Courville, A. C., Daw, N. D., and Touretzky, D. S. (2006). Bayesian theories
of conditioning in a changing world. Trends Cogn. Sci. 10, 294–300. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2006.05.004
DeWitt, T. J., Sih, A., and Wilson, D. S. (1998). Costs and limits of phenotypic
plasticity. Trends Ecol. Evol. 13, 77–81. doi: 10.1016/S0169-5347(97)01274-3
DiRienzo, N., Pruitt, J. N., and Hedrick, A. V. (2012). Juvenile exposure to acoustic
sexual signals from conspecifics alters growth trajectory and an adult personality
trait. Anim. Behav. 84, 861–868. doi: 10.1016/j.anbehav.2012.07.007
Dixon, K. A., and Cade, W. H. (1986). Some factors influencing male male aggres-
sion in the field cricket Gryllus integer (time of day, age, weight and sexual
maturity). Anim. Behav. 34, 340–346. doi: 10.1016/S0003-3472(86)80102-6
Edenbrow, M., and Croft, D. P. (2011). Behavioural types and life history strate-
gies during ontogeny in the mangrove killifish, Kryptolebias marmoratus. Anim.
Behav. 82, 731–741. doi: 10.1016/j.anbehav.2011.07.003
Edenbrow, M., and Croft, D. P. (2013). Environmental and genetic effects shape
the development of personality traits in the mangrove killifish Kryptolebias
marmoratus. Oikos 122, 667–681. doi: 10.1111/j.1600-0706.2012.20556.x
Fischer, B., Van Doorn, G. S., Dieckmann, U., and Taborsky, B. (2014). The
evolution of age-dependent plasticity. Am. Nat. 183, 108–125. doi: 10.1086/
674008
Fox, N. A., Henderson, H. A., Marshall, P. J., Nichols, K. E., and Ghera, M. M.
(2005). Behavioral inhibition: linking biology and behavior within a devel-
opmental framework. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 56, 235–262. doi: 10.1146/annurev.
psych.55.090902.141532
Frankenhuis, W. E., and Panchanathan, K. (2011a). Balancing sampling and spe-
cialization: an adaptationist model of incremental development. Proc. R. Soc. B
278, 3558–3565. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2011.0055
Frankenhuis, W. E., and Panchanathan, K. (2011b). Individual differences in devel-
opmental plasticity may result from stochastic sampling. Perspect. Psychol. Sci.
6, 336–347. doi: 10.1177/1745691611412602
Fratkin, J. L., Sinn, D. L., Patall, E. A., and Gosling, S. D. (2013). Personality consis-
tency in dogs: a meta-analysis. PLoS ONE 8:e54907. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.
0054907
Frost, A. J., Thomson, J. S., Smith, C., Burton, H. C., Davis, B., Watts, P. C.,
et al. (2013). Environmental change alters personality in the rainbow trout,
Oncorhynchus mykiss.Anim. Behav. 85, 1199–1207. doi: 10.1016/j.anbehav.2013.
03.006
Gomez-Mestre, I., and Jovani, R. (2013). A heuristic model on the role of plasticity
in adaptive evolution: plasticity increases adaptation, population viability and
genetic variation. Proc. R. Soc. B 280:20131869. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2013.1869
Gyuris, E., Fero, O., and Barta, Z. (2012). Personality traits across ontogeny in
firebugs, Pyrrhocoris apterus. Anim. Behav. 84, 103–109. doi: 10.1016/j.anbehav.
2012.04.014
Hayes, J. P., and Jenkins, S. H. (1997). Individual variation inmammals. J. Mammal.
78, 274–293. doi: 10.2307/1382882
Ingleby, F. C., Hunt, J., and Hosken, D. J. (2013). Genotype-by-environment inter-
actions for female mate choice of male cuticular hydrocarbons in Drosophila
simulans. PLoS ONE 8:e67623. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0067623
Kasumovic, M. M., Hall, M. D., Try, H., and Brooks, R. C. (2011). The impor-
tance of listening: juvenile allocation shifts in response to acoustic cues of the
social environment. J. Evol. Biol. 24, 1325–1334. doi: 10.1111/j.1420-9101.2011.
02267.x
Keiser, C. N., and Mondor, E. B. (2013). Transgenerational behavioral plasticity in
a parthenogenetic insect in response to increased predation risk. J. Insect Behav.
26, 603–613. doi: 10.1007/s10905-013-9376-6
Lange, A., and Dukas, R. (2009). Bayesian approximations and extensions: optimal
decisions for small brains and possibly big ones too. J. Theor. Biol. 259, 503–516.
doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.03.020
Leimar, O., Hammerstein, P., and VanDooren, T. J. M. (2006). A new perspective on
developmental plasticity and the principles of adaptive morph determination.
Am. Nat. 167, 367–376. doi: 10.1086/499566
Lickliter, R. (2008). The growth of developmental thought: implications for a
new evolutionary psychology. New Ideas Psychol. 26, 353–369. doi: 10.1016/j.
newideapsych.2007.07.015
Lloyd, K., and Leslie, D. S. (2013). Context-dependent decision-making: a simple
Bayesian model. J. R. Soc. Interface 10:20130069. doi: 10.1098/rsif.2013.0069
Lucas, R. E., and Donnellan, M. B. (2011). Personality development across the life
span: longitudinal analyses with a national sample from Germany. J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 101, 847–861. doi: 10.1037/a0024298
McDermott, D. R., Chips, M. J., McGuirk, M., Armagost, F., Dirienzo, N., and
Pruitt, J. N. (2014). Boldness is influenced by sublethal interactions with
predators and is associated with successful harem infiltration in Madagascar
hissing cockroaches. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. 68, 425–435. doi: 10.1007/s00265-
013-1657-8
McGraw, K. O., and Wong, S. P. (1996). Forming inferences about some intr-
aclass correlation coefficients. Psychol. Methods 1, 30–46. doi: 10.1037/1082-
989X.1.4.390
McLinn, C. M., and Stephens, D. W. (2006). What makes information valuable:
signal reliability and environmental uncertainty. Anim. Behav. 71, 1119–1129.
doi: 10.1016/j.anbehav.2005.09.006
McNamara, J. M., Green, R. F., and Olsson, O. (2006). Bayes’ theorem and its
applications in animal behaviour.Oikos 112, 243–251. doi: 10.1111/j.0030-1299.
2006.14228.x
Moy, S. S., Nadler, J. J., Young, N. B., Perez, A., Holloway, L. P., Barbaro, R. P.,
et al. (2007).Mouse behavioral tasks relevant to autism: phenotypes of 10 inbred
strains. Behav. Brain Res. 176, 4–20. doi: 10.1016/j.bbr.2006.07.030
Nakagawa, S., and Schielzeth, H. (2010). Repeatability for Gaussian and non-
Gaussian data: a practical guide for biologists. Biol. Rev. Camb. Philos. Soc. 85,
935–956. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-185X.2010.00141.x
Oyama, S. (2000). The Ontogeny of Information: Developmental Systems and
Evolution. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. doi: 10.1215/9780822380665
Petelle, M. B., McCoy, D. E., Alejandro, V., Martin, J. G. A., and Blumstein, D. T.
(2013). Development of boldness and docility in yellow-bellied marmots. Anim.
Behav. 86, 1147–1154. doi: 10.1016/j.anbehav.2013.09.016
Piersma, T., and Drent, J. (2003). Phenotypic flexibility and the evolution of
organismal design. Trends Ecol. Evol. 18, 228–233. doi: 10.1016/S0169-5347(03)
00036-3
Reale, D., Reader, S. M., Sol, D., McDougall, P. T., and Dingemanse, N. J. (2007).
Integrating animal temperament within ecology and evolution. Biol. Rev. Camb.
Philos. Soc. 82, 291–318. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-185X.2007.00010.x
Reddon, A. R. (2012). Parental effects on animal personality. Behav. Ecol. 23,
242–245. doi: 10.1093/beheco/arr210
Riemer, S., Muller, C., Viranyi, Z., Huber, L., and Range, F. (2014). The predictive
value of early behavioural assessments in pet dogs - a longitudinal study from
neonates to adults. PLoS ONE 9:e101237. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0101237
Rillich, J., Schildberger, K., and Stevenson, P. A. (2011). Octopamine and occu-
pancy: an aminergic mechanism for intruder-resident aggression in crickets.
Proc. R. Soc. B 278, 1873–1880. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2010.2099
Roberts, B. W., and Delvecchio, W. F. (2000). The rank-order consistency of per-
sonality traits from childhood to old age: a quantitative review of longitudinal
studies. Psychol. Bull. 126, 3–25. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.126.1.3
Rodriguez, R. L. (2013). Causes of variation in genotype x environment interaction.
Evol. Ecol. Res. 15, 733–746.
Sambandan, D., Carbone, M. A., Anholt, R. R. H., and Mackay, T. E. C. (2008).
Phenotypic plasticity and genotype by environment interaction for olfactory
behavior in Drosophila melanogaster. Genetics 179, 1079–1088. doi: 10.1534/
genetics.108.086769
Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution | Behavioral and Evolutionary Ecology October 2014 | Volume 2 | Article 69 | 12
Stamps and Krishnan Developmental plasticity of personality
Schuett, W., Dall, S. R. X., Wilson, A. J., and Royle, N. J. (2013). Environmental
transmission of a personality trait: foster parent exploration behaviour predicts
offspring exploration behaviour in zebra finches. Biol. Lett. 9, 20130120. doi:
10.1098/rsbl.2013.0120
Shea, N. (2007). Representation in the genome and in other inheritance systems.
Biol. Philos. 22, 313–331. doi: 10.1007/s10539-006-9046-6
Shea, N., Pen, I., and Uller, T. (2011). Three epigenetic information channels and
their different roles in evolution. J. Evol. Biol. 24, 1178–1187. doi: 10.1111/j.
1420-9101.2011.02235.x
Shettleworth, S. J. (2010). Cognition, Evolution and Behavior.New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Sinn, D. L., Gosling, S. D., and Moltschaniwskyj, N. A. (2008). Development of
shy/bold behaviour in squid: context-specific phenotypes associated with devel-
opmental plasticity. Anim. Behav. 75, 433–442. doi: 10.1016/j.anbehav.2007.
05.008
Snell-Rood, E. C. (2013). An overview of the evolutionary causes and consequences
of behavioural plasticity. Anim. Behav. 85, 1004–1011. doi: 10.1016/j.anbehav.
2012.12.031
Stamps, J. A., and Groothuis, T. G. G. (2010b). Developmental perspectives
on personality: implications for ecological and evolutionary studies of indi-
vidual differences. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 365, 4029–4041. doi: 10.1098/rstb.
2010.0218
Stamps, J., and Groothuis, T. G. G. (2010a). The development of animal person-
ality: relevance, concepts and perspectives. Biol. Rev. Camb. Philos. Soc. 85,
301–325. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-185X.2009.00103.x
Stamps, J., and Krishnan, V. V. (in press). Combining information from ances-
tors and personal experiences to predict individual differences in developmental
trajectories. Am. Nat.
Sussman, A., and Ha, J. (2011). Developmental and cross-situational stability in
infant pigtailed macaque temperament.Dev. Psychol. 47, 781–791. doi: 10.1037/
a0022999
Thomson, J. S., Watts, P. C., Pottinger, T. G., and Sneddon, L. U. (2012). Plasticity
of boldness in rainbow trout, Oncorhynchus mykiss: do hunger and preda-
tion influence risk-taking behaviour? Horm. Behav. 61, 750–757. doi: 10.1016/j.
yhbeh.2012.03.014
Thornton, A., and Lukas, D. (2012). Individual variation in cognitive per-
formance: developmental and evolutionary perspectives. Philos. Trans.
R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 367, 2773–2783. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2012.
0214
Tufto, J. (2000). The evolution of plasticity and nonplastic spatial and temporal
adaptations in the presence of imperfect environmental cues. Am. Nat. 156,
121–130. doi: 10.1086/303381
Uller, T. (2008). Developmental plasticity and the evolution of parental effects.
Trends Ecol. Evol. 23, 432–438. doi: 10.1016/j.tree.2008.04.005
Wolf, M., Van Doorn, G. S., and Weissing, F. J. (2008). Evolutionary emergence
of responsive and unresponsive personalities. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 105,
15825–15830. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0805473105
Wolf, M., Van Doorn, G. S., and Weissing, F. J. (2011). On the coevolution of social
responsiveness and behavioural consistency. Proc. R. Soc. B 278, 440–448. doi:
10.1098/rspb.2010.1051
Ydenberg, R. C., and Prins, H. H. T. (2012). “Foraging,” in Behavioural Responses
to a Changing World, eds U. Candolin and B. M. Wong (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press), 93–105.
Zhou, Y., Kuster, H. K., Pettis, J. S., Danka, R. G., Gleason, J. M., and Greenfield,
M. D. (2008). Reaction norm variants for male calling song in populations
of Achroia grisella (Lepidoptera: Pyralidae): toward a resolution of the lek
paradox. Evolution 62, 1317–1334. doi: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.2008.00371.x
Conflict of Interest Statement: The Guest Associate Editor Ann Valerie Hedrick
declares that, despite being affiliated with the same institution as author Judy
Stamps, the review process was handled objectively and no conflict of interest
exists. The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of
any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 12 September 2014; paper pending published: 28 September 2014; accepted:
06 October 2014; published online: 30 October 2014.
Citation: Stamps JA and Krishnan VV (2014) Individual differences in the potential
and realized developmental plasticity of personality traits. Front. Ecol. Evol. 2:69. doi:
10.3389/fevo.2014.00069
This article was submitted to Behavioral and Evolutionary Ecology, a section of the
journal Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution.
Copyright © 2014 Stamps and Krishnan. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal
is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 2 | Article 69 | 13
Stamps and Krishnan Developmental plasticity of personality
APPENDIX
EFFECTS OF THE MEANS AND VARIANCES OF PRIOR DISTRIBUTIONS
ON BAYESIAN UPDATING (REPRINTED, WITH PERMISSION, FROM
STAMPS AND KRISHNAN, IN PRESS; ©2014 BY THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO)
Here we show how differences between individuals in the means
of their prior distributions affect Bayesian updating. One indi-
vidual (Figure A1A) has a prior distribution with a high mean,
indicating that at birth or hatching, this individual estimates that
the level of danger is more likely to be high than it is to be low or
moderate. This individual is then maintained for a period (e.g., a
month) under “safe” conditions, with no exposure to cues from
predators, aggressive conspecifics, or any other potential dangers.
As is indicated by the shape of the likelihood function, this type
of experience is more likely to occur when the level of danger
is low than when it is moderate to high. When this individual’s
prior distribution is combined with this likelihood function, via
Bayesian updating, it yields the posterior distribution shown in
Figure A1A. That is, after the experience, this individual revises
downwards its belief about the level of danger. Finally, assuming
that “boldness” is negatively related to the mean of the prior or
the posterior distribution for danger, we would expect this indi-
vidual to be bolder after the experience (based on the mean of its
posterior distribution) than it was when it was naive (based on
the mean of its prior distribution).
A second individual (Figure A1B) has a prior distribution with
a low mean, indicating that when it is naïve, this individual esti-
mates that the level of danger is more likely to be low than it is to
be moderate to high. This individual is then exposed to the same
experience (same likelihood function) as was the case for the indi-
vidual in Figure A1A. However, in this case, the estimate of the
state of danger provided by this individual’s prior distribution is
very similar to the estimate of the state of danger provided by the
experience. As a result, its posterior distribution is very similar to
its prior distribution. By extension, we would expect this individ-
ual’s boldness score after the experience to be similar to its score
when it was naïve.
This example illustrates a very general and very basic fea-
ture of Bayesian updating, namely that the effects of a given
experience on estimates of the state of the world depend on
the discrepancy between the prior distribution and the likeli-
hood function (Courville et al., 2006). One can intuitively see
that if a naïve individual believes that the world is a safe place,
an extended period of time with no cues indicative of dan-
ger simply confirms its initial belief, and hence, has little or no
effect on its belief that the world is safe. On the other hand,
if a naïve individual believes that the world is dangerous, an
extended period of time with no cues indicative of danger is a
“surprise,” so this experience is more likely to change its estimate
of danger.
A second important point is that the effect of a potentially
informative experience on an individual’s estimate of the state of
the world also depends on the variance of its prior distribution
(Figure A2). Consider a situation in which two individuals both
have prior distributions with the same mean value (mean = 0.8).
That is, when naïve, both of them estimate that the state of danger
is relatively high. However, the variance of the first individual’s
prior distribution (Figure A2A) is much higher than the vari-
FIGURE A1 | Effect of the mean of the prior distribution on Bayesian
updating. Two individuals (A,B) are both exposed to the same
experience, with the likelihood function indicated in red. The first
individual (A) has a prior distribution with a high mean; the second
individual (B) has a prior distribution with a low mean. When the
likelihood function and the prior distribution contradict each other (A),
the posterior distribution is displaced from the prior distribution. In
contrast, when the likelihood function and the prior distribution are
concordant (B), the posterior distribution is very similar to the prior
distribution.
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FIGURE A2 | Effect of the variance of the prior distribution on
Bayesian updating. Two individuals (A,B) are both exposed to the
same experience, with the likelihood function indicated in red. Both
individuals have prior distributions with the same mean, but the
individual in (A) has a prior distribution with a high variance, whereas
the individual in (B) has a prior distribution with a low variance.
When variance of the prior is high (A), the posterior distribution is
displaced from the prior distribution. However, when the variance of
the prior is low (B), the posterior distribution is virtually the same as
the prior distribution.
ance of the second individual’s prior distribution (Figure A2B).
Both individuals are then exposed to experience indicating that
the level of danger is moderately low. In the case of the first indi-
vidual, this experience leads to a reduction in its estimate of the
level of danger, i.e., a posterior distribution shifted to the left of
its prior distribution (Figure A2A). However, in the case of the
second individual, the same experience has little effect on its esti-
mate of danger; its posterior distribution is very similar to its
prior distribution (Figure A2B). Thus, although both individu-
als would be expected to express the same high level of boldness
when naïve, after the same experience, the first individual’s level
of boldness would increase, but the second individual’s level of
boldness would not change.
In this case, the intuitive explanation is that the variance of an
individual’s prior distribution indicates the confidence an indi-
vidual has in its initial belief about the state of the world. If a naïve
individual vaguely suspects that the world might be dangerous,
experience indicating it is actually safe should alter its estimate of
the state of the danger, and hence, its behavior. However, if a naïve
individual firmly believes that the world is dangerous, that same
experience should have little or no effect on either this belief or its
behavior.
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